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There exists a large body of research that has studied cognitive flexibility as an executive function 
assessed through shifting and set-switching tasks. This approach has been criticised as overly narrow 
and reductionist (Ionescu, 2012; 2017), thereby undermining the relevance of cognitive flexibility 
beyond tightly controlled cognitive tasks. In light of such limitations, we review the extant literature 
and reflect on the understanding of cognitive flexibility as (1) an cognitive approach to novelty 
processing and (2) as a conative disposition toward novelty. We present a theoretical model of 
cognitive flexibility as a meta-competency reflected in adaptive performance which emerges as a 
strategic response to novelty in dynamic environments. This meta-competency draws on a confluence 
of cognitive and conative variables that are actively and adaptively harnessed by an individual under 






Cognitive Flexibility as a Meta-Competency 
As the information era marches on, it has become clear that the demands for innovation, premised 
on individual creativity and flexibility in the 21st century workplace have shifted substantially from 
what they were a few mere decades ago, in both their nature and their extent. Research on these 
constructs, as well as related abilities and dispositions, must evolve to keep pace with this change. Our 
overarching goal for this paper is to reflect on the notion of cognitive flexibility, which we (and 
others) see as a prerequisite for creativity, and as a moderator of the creative process. To achieve this, 
we recognise that while cognitive flexibility has an obvious cognitive character, its conative and meta-
cognitive nature is often overlooked when it is operationalised as a unidimensional, individual 
differences variable. Thus our second aim is to briefly review the extant literature and reflect on the 
understanding of the term cognitive flexibility as (1) a cognitive approach to novelty processing, as it 
is sometimes linked in conceptual definitions of fluid intelligence, and (2) as a conative disposition 
toward novelty. We conclude by surmising that there is a case for considering cognitive flexibility as 
a meta-competency to unify cognitive, conative, and situational dependencies, rather than thinking of 
cognitive flexibility simply as a component of a broader flexibility, as it is frequently conceived. 
Cognitive Flexibility in Concepts of Intelligence 
The traditional construct of general intelligence has largely failed to meet the contemporary 
empirical and theoretical challenges pitted against it to sufficiently explain successes and failures in 
everyday function (Sternberg, 2011). For example, while intelligence traditionally conceived (e.g. as 
g, Spearman, 1923) has served as an effective predictor of workplace performance (Schmidt and 
Hunter, 1998; Gotfredson, 2018), meta-analyses have routinely highlighted how conative and 
metacognitive variables (e.g. degree of reflective self-assessment, creative and practical intelligence, 
and “grit”) routinely account for a significant amount of unique variance in workplace performance 
beyond IQ (e.g., Sitzmann & Ely, 2011; Credé, Tynan, & Harms, 2017; Colquitt, 2000). Scherbaum et 
al. (2012) argue that theories of ‘pure intelligence’ are ill-equipped to explain variation in actual 
dynamic performances across a range of workplace demands, which are better understood through 
notions of flexibility, adaptation, and learning on the job.  One reason for this misalignment is that 
 4 
despite conceptual definitions of “intelligence” suggesting otherwise, psychometric tests of 
intelligence, such as Raven’s Progressive Matrices (RPM, Raven 1941), were never designed as 
indicators of flexibility. Furthermore, the way test performance was subsequently translated into a 
score (i.e., operationalised), was always going to be incapable of measuring the dynamic aspects of 
such constructs, in spite of them being routinely interpreted to do so (cf Beckmann, 2014; Birney, 
Beckmann, Beckmann, in press). While psychometric tools such as the RPM purportedly predict test 
takers’ propensity to direct actual learning and flexibility in criterion tasks, such tests do not explicitly 
provide opportunities to assess these competencies directly (Bui & Birney, 2014). We argue (as have 
others in other contexts, Beckmann, 2006), that the most important aspect of theoretical definitions of 
intelligence (especially fluid intelligence) — the propensity for flexibility of thought in novel contexts 
— which affords its broad relevance, is better operationalised in other ways.  
In response to these foundational limitations, over the course of his career, Sternberg has 
presented a theoretical framework of intelligence defined as a competency which dictates an 
individual’s ability to perform optimally across a range of problem states within a given domain 
(Sternberg, 1997), the ability to deal with novelty (Sternberg, 1987), to succeed through overcoming a 
range of novel challenges (one is reminded of the adage ‘it’s not just what you know, it’s how you use 
it’), and to be both wise and creative (Sternberg, 2003). Aligned with this interactionist approach (see 
Todd & Gigerenzer, 2007 for a related perspective on decision making), there has been a 
reinvigorated research effort focused specifically on the "cognitive flexibility" construct, as evinced 
by a 2019 search of the term in literature databases yielding more than 3000 results on PsycINFO, 
with approximately 1500 in the last 5 years alone. In the remaining sections, we aim to map out and 
elaborate on theoretical connections between the often-disparate research areas of cognitive 
flexibility, creativity and the broader framework of modern intelligence research. In doing so, we 
hope to flesh out the latter by elucidating how specific cognitive processes broadly linked to 
flexibility in the literature (i.e., set-switching, self-monitoring, and transfer of learning) interact in 
their causal contribution towards adaptive performance.  
Assessment of Cognitive Flexibility and Creativity 
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Firstly, what creativity and cognitive flexibility have in common is how both are positioned in 
contrast to intelligence in the way they are operationalised. Psychometric tests of general cognitive 
ability (be it fluid or crystallized) feature almost exclusively convergent problem-solving within a 
consistent and well-defined task paradigm of knowledge acquisition and application (often within an 
abstract context). On the other hand, cognitive flexibility is concerned with how individuals shift their 
cognition to effectively respond to novelty in problem states (Beckmann, 2014), and creativity centres 
on how people generate (multiple) novel solutions to a single problem. The paradigm for such 
assessments is distinctly ‘divergent’. Secondly, while flexibility and creativity are intuitively related 
(in that novel problem states often require novel strategies), it is important to recognise that they are 
not the same. Despite an observed overlap in measures, the early literature on cognitive flexibility 
attempted to differentiate it from creativity by defining the former as the "ability to vary one's mode 
of approach" (Cosden, Ellis, & Feeney, 1979, p. 386) and a "superordinate ability" which involved 
"[choosing] an optimal control process and [implementing] it effectively" (Macleod, 1979, p. 535). 
This distinction was later expanded upon by Sternberg (2007), who contrasted creativity with a 
competency he called “practical intelligence”. While Sternberg’s view aligns with previous research, 
in that creativity involves the generation of solutions that are novel and original (Torrance, 1988; 
Nickerson, 1999), he describes practical intelligence as “the set of skills and dispositions used to solve 
everyday problems by applying knowledge… to purposefully adapt to, shape, and select 
environments” (p. 39) 1.  This is a set of adaptive skills which intrinsically encapsulates the situational 
evaluation of available strategies (which are often creatively generated by the individual themselves) 
and executing them effectively, skills which underpin the intuitive conceptualisation of cognitive 
flexibility.  
 
1 We do not wish to suggest here that creativity involves the purely non-normative ‘anything goes’ 
generation of ideas, as there must logically exist a baseline of marginal acceptability, which incorporates the 
criteria of usefulness and appropriateness (Torrance, 1988; Runco & Smith, 1982) against which responses are 
evaluated. Rather, the purpose of this comparison was simply to show that there are indeed conceptual 
differences between the two constructs. More specifically, we speculate that their relationship may be analogous 
to the System 1/System 2 distinction in Stanovich and West (2000) in which the semi-automatic System 1 
(creativity in this case) generates workable solutions which are passed on to System 2 (the ‘slow’ deliberate and 
adaptive awareness in cognitive flexibility) to evaluate in terms of its situational suitability for the current 
problem state.  
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Acknowledging basic differences between creativity and cognitive flexibility, we now consider 
the defining features of cognitive flexibility that justify it as a necessary topic to study in tandem with 
intellect. While there exist many approaches to studying cognitive flexibility, the two most common 
and relevant perspectives to the current discussion are the set-switching/shifting view and the meta-
theoretical approach. 
Cognitive flexibility as a distinct ability: too broad or too narrow? 
The logic of the set-switching view is perhaps best illustrated through a methodological outline of 
one of its common tools: the Wisconsin Card Sorting Task (WCST; originally proposed by Grant and 
Berg, 1948). In this task, participants are instructed to sort a deck of cards into different piles 
according to a set of basic rules (e.g. shape or colour of the stimuli). At an unannounced point during 
the task, these sorting rules change, and participants must deduce the new sorting rule through 
feedback obtained through trial-and-error and update responses to be congruent with the current 
requirements. The fewer perseverative errors an individual makes following a rule change (i.e. the 
faster they adapt to the new task demands), the higher their ‘cognitive flexibility score’. Moreover, 
this tacit assumption that cognitive flexibility can be cleanly separated from other cognitive processes 
also plays out in neuroscience research which attempts to localise set-switching competencies to 
specific parts of the brain (see Kehagia, Murray, & Robbins, 2010 for a review). This ‘cognitive-
flexibility-as-distinct-ability’ was subsequently formalised in Diamond (2013), in which the summary 
of cognitive flexibility research was largely framed under the label of ‘shifting’ within the tripartite 
model of executive functions, alongside inhibition and updating (Miyake et al., 2000). 
While this arguably narrow conceptualisation of cognitive flexibility boasts less generalisability 
outside of developmental and neuropsychological/clinical contexts (a ‘normal’ functioning sample 
will show ceiling effects after a few trials of these tasks), it nonetheless contributes to a conceptually 
enriched account of healthy intellectual functioning by elucidating the lower-order 
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cognitive/perceptual operations that necessarily enable flexible performance at a macroscopic level.2  
This being said, we (e.g., Beckmann, 2014), as have others before us (e.g., Ionescu, 2012; 2017), 
argue that restricting the discussion of cognitive flexibility to research on a narrow paradigm (albeit a 
well-established one) of set-switching needlessly limits its relevance to understanding the super-
ordinate class of flexible behaviour. For an analogical example in reading research, readers’ 
individual eye movements across words and sentences are a major determinant of the quality and 
speed of lexical comprehension (Veldre & Andrews, 2018; Hersch & Andrews, 2012). However, it 
would be a logical overstep to equate eye movements with lexical comprehension itself, or to explain 
higher-order reading-related phenomena purely as a function of their constituent perceptual processes 
(Marr, 1982).  
Acknowledging these limitations of a switching-only account, Ionescu (2017) presents an 
alternative process-focussed framework which characterises cognitive flexibility as the culmination of 
an overall experiential trajectory from behavioural variability, to narrow stability, and finally to 
flexibility. In this model, which similarly seeks to explains flexible performance in terms of mediating 
cognitive (as well as essential metacognitive) processes, the initial stage of variability refers to the 
phase when an individual is first exposed to a novel environment and behaviour is characterised by 
non-systematic strategy selection and inconsistent overall task performance. If we were to map other 
perspectives of cognitive flexibility here, this stage is likely the one during which personality traits 
(e.g. openness, need for cognition) exert their strongest effect on cognitive flexibility, as individuals 
are motivated to seek out and experiment with a wide range of novel strategies (DeYoung, Peterson, 
& Higgins, 2005; Good, 2014). The intermediate stage of stability begins when individuals develop a 
workable strategy that is generally applicable across narrow instances of a stable task environment. 
This stage most closely resembles the traditional conception of expertise where outstanding 
performance is attributed to the consistency in executing a well-rehearsed set of behaviours achieved 
through a long duration of routine training. However, only when an individual is able to deliberately 
 
2 For the sake of brevity, we have opted to include only a bird’s eye view of the set-switching perspective. 
For more detailed models of set-switching which further separate the ‘operation’ into its different 
cognitive/behavioural constituents, see Ravizza and Carter (2018) and De Baene, Albers, and Brass (2012). 
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and effectively tailor their strategic response to shifting task demands are they considered to have 
demonstrated genuine cognitive flexibility over and above stable performance (what Birney et al., 
2012 and Ward et al. (2018) refer to as flexible expertise). At this last stage, the individual's approach 
has shifted from non-systematic to consistently optimal that is achieved precisely because of a 
considered, nuanced adaptation in strategy.  
As above, much of the recent research on cognitive flexibility has investigated how it emerges 
from a dynamic interplay between person, task and situation factors. As such, we believe a 
comprehensive understanding of the construct can be best achieved through a higher-order, meta-
theoretical account which integrates theory and research findings from the diversity of relevant 
perspectives. Given this, we present below a preliminary formulation for such a model based on a 
recent thematic review we conducted on how cognitive flexibility is defined in different research 
contexts (Birney, Beckmann & Yu, in preparation). 
Cognitive flexibility as an emergent meta-competency 
The central thesis of cognitive flexibility from a meta-competency perspective builds on two 
premises. First, that cognitive flexibility is a contextualised emerging property of the cognitive 
system, rather than a unidimensional ability that is isolated in, for instance, the aforementioned 
laboratory tasks (Ionescu, 2012). Second, that flexibility entails the sensitivity, capacity and 
inclination to detect, deliberately select and execute a specific, optimal strategy, rather than just a 
descriptive account of one’s general tendency to switch between modes of operation in a manner 
which may or may not be akin to trial-and-error.  
At a meta-theoretical level, cognitive flexibility is a key capacity which underpins what Sternberg 
(1997) conceptualised as practical intelligence, namely the awareness and ability to adapt one’s 
strategy to the specific situation at hand. Battig (1979) proposed that while a portfolio of suitable 
strategies is an important precondition for flexibility, the awareness, ability, and motivation to 
adaptively utilise this knowledge in a dynamic environment is the additional emergent competency 
that qualitatively distinguishes cognitive flexibility from the traditional construct of crystallized 
 9 
intelligence. That is to say, although a strong base of explicit knowledge is necessary to be cognitively 
flexible (this is almost true by definition as there must exist a number of well-rehearsed strategies to 
switch between in the first place), it is not sufficient. Much in the same way that Fleeson's (2001) 
formalised the study of within-subject variability on Big-5 traits as itself a meaningful meta-trait (i.e. 
some individuals were more systematically variable on their expression on one or more of the Big-5 
traits; consistent in their inconsistency, as it were), we have argued that the variability observed in an 
individual’s pattern of responses on a cognitive task may reflect a considered choice on their part to 
match the (perceived) demands of the specific task at hand (Birney, Beckmann, & Beckmann, in 
press). 
While Battig's (1979) model was proposed cautiously by the author at the time of publication, we 
believe that the four decades of research across multiple contexts conducted since have provided 
strong support for this integrated meta-theoretical account. It is reflected in Krampe and Baltes’ 
(2003) notion of intelligence as adaptive resource development in the Selection-Optimization-
Compensation model, Ericsson’s (2003) concept of avoiding arrested development through deliberate 
practice beyond the automaticity of routine expertise, and intelligence-as-knowledge component of 
Ackerman’s (1996) structural model, each of which entails strong metacognitive, motivational 
features.  
The key distinction between the mere possession of knowledge and the flexible use of knowledge 
is also salient in a number of theories of adaptive functioning outside of the intelligence literature. For 
instance, Cognitive Flexibility Theory (Spiro et al., 1988) differentiates knowledgeable individuals 
from flexible individuals who harness their knowledge-in-use in a wide array of novel situations for 
problem solving in ill-structured domains. Laureiro-Martínez and Brusoni (2018) distinguishes 
between managers with a wealth of experience who are rigid in their use of the knowledge, and 
managers who efficiently switch between ‘fast’ and ‘slow’ modes of thinking (Kahneman, 2011) 
according to the situation. This adaptive functioning is similarly reflected in the distinction between 
individuals who can execute a single strategy well under stable conditions from those who can also 
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switch to a more suitable strategy when the task environment changes without warning (Cañas et al., 
2003; Cañas et al., 2005; Ward et al., 2018).  
Birney, Beckmann, and Wood (2012) reflected on the challenges of understanding flexible-
expertise. That while component skills and abilities can be isolated,  
“… what cannot easily be addressed is that every individual brings with them different 
experiences and clusters of personal characteristics and interests, various motivations and 
metacognitive and self-regulatory skills and processes that will play out differently in different 
situations. Although flexibility can be (and has been) defined behaviorally, the processes 
impacting on how well someone will perform in a changing situation will, inter alia, depend on 
their capacity to rapidly sense change, to drill down to the critical details for the problem at 
hand, to take into consideration the full range of competing expectations and demands, to rapidly 
and effectively change tact if implemented solutions are not working, and any other number of 
skills that various researchers have proposed.” (p 573)  
Following on from this, the utility of this meta-competency model of cognitive flexibility to the 
individual differences approach is derived from its intrinsically meta-theoretical conceptualisation 
which can accommodate the influence of conative factors and reflective awareness, variables which 
have been shown to empirically predict flexible performance over and above classic notions of 
intelligence. To this point, we believe that this account is an improvement from a model which 
equates a latent construct of cognitive flexibility with the manifest behaviour of set-switching, as it 
provides a psychological explanation for observed changes in performance that occur as a function of 
learning, rather than resorting to a non-comital redescription of the psychometric data. Additionally, 
by elaborating on the antecedents of cognitive flexibility (see Birney et al., 2012), this approach also 
facilitates research which tackles questions of what learning conditions foster the development of this 
meta-competency. This is a pertinent question because it is proving to be increasingly important in 
dynamic work environments defined by the need to constantly adapt to different, novel, and 
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unfamiliar task demands rather than the reapplication of a narrow portfolio of pre-packaged strategies 
(Gruber, MacMillan, & Thompson, 2012; Laureiro-Martínez & Brusoni, 2018). 
A naturalistic way to measure cognitive flexibility 
To further assist in setting the research agenda, we conclude by analysing the implications of our 
meta-theoretical model for the measurement of cognitive flexibility. Given that cognitive flexibility is 
multifaceted in much the same way as Ackerman and Beier’s (2003) notion of trait-complexes, in that 
it emerges from a particular profile of cognitive and conative dispositions that coalesce around an 
environmental cue, we acknowledge that it is unlikely to be well-measured in whole by any single 
task.  
 
Figure 1. Flexibility as a meta-competency emerging from a cluster of cognitive and conative factors linked to 
outcomes via situation/context interactions 
 
This being said, since an individual’s meta-cognitive awareness to optimally match their strategy 
to the task and the situation is central to our model (as represented in Figure 1 above), we believe that 
the scales researchers use would benefit from increased sensitivity to these interaction variables. On 
one end of the ‘meta-cognitive’ continuum lie the instructed switching tasks which periodically 
include explicit instructions to switch from one well-defined task strategy to other – equally well 
defined – alternatives (e.g. categorising visual stimuli according to phonetics or by semantic features). 


















On the other end of the spectrum lie measurements which purport to boast greater ‘ecological 
validity’, such as the Firechief microworld by Omodei and Wearing (1995) used to study cognitive 
flexibility in Cañas et al. (2003) and Cañas et al. (2005). In these substantially less structured tasks, 
although the goal state is embedded within an intuitive context (prevent a fire from spreading), 
creativity (defined traditionally here as the spontaneous and divergent generation of plausibly 
appropriate ideas) is both incentivised and necessary in the decision-making process, as individuals 
must formulate their strategies 'from scratch' in order to build up a diverse strategic cache for when a 
change occurs. When compared to tightly constrained laboratory tasks (such as the WCST and Trail 
Making Test), proponents of these types of complex problem-solving tasks argue that their ill-
structuredness and demands on creative thinking more closely mirror the challenging experience of 
naturalistic problem-solving outside the laboratory (Dörner & Funke, 2017; Scherer, 2015), where 
decision-makers are often required to generate their own novel solutions to novel problems and decide 
on their own when it is optimal to shift in response to sudden unannounced changes in the task 
environment.3 Going forward, while we recognize there are challenges in consolidating past efforts 
into a rigorous focused measure of cognitive flexibility — chief among them being the delicate 
balance between the domain-specificity (that is needed to justify the label of being more “ecologically 
valid” than other assessments) and generalisability of the particular problem-solving environment 
used — these examples illustrate the utility of measuring a dynamic construct (i.e. cognitive 
flexibility as we have presented it) with a similarly dynamic paradigm. 
In closing, it is evident that modern intelligence research should progress beyond its traditional 
psychometric leanings towards a more holistic process-driven approach which develops and 
incorporates more fully the cognitive and behavioural antecedents of real-world performance in 
 
3 Cañas et al. (2005) provides an example of how this dynamic methodology can be implemented. From an 
assessment standpoint, an individual’s cognitive flexibility was operationalised with a similar logic as in the 
WCST, where their ‘flexibility score’ for a single session was calculated proportionally to the number of trials 
that it took after a parameter shift in the task system (e.g. the relative effectiveness of a particular discrete 
action, say, firing ineffective employees) to reattain their pre-shift aggregate performance and/or gradient of 
improvement. In doing so, the researchers were measuring cognitive flexibility through assessing whether 
participants registered the sudden shift in task conditions as an indicator that it would be beneficial to change 
their approach, as well as the speed and precision with which they were able to switch to an appropriate strategy. 
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greater theoretical detail. Due to how it emerges from an interaction between both cognitive and 
conative variables, and the interaction between these and dynamically changing task and/or situational 
factors, cognitive flexibility is one construct which has the potential to greatly enhance the 
explanatory reach of the field at large. In keeping with this rationale, we hope that the meta-
theoretical model we have presented in this paper extends the study of cognitive flexibility beyond a 
narrow ‘flexibility-as-ability’ framing and acts as a preliminary catalyst for future research in line 
with an integrative approach. 
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